Living ‘the good life’ is a key topic of debate within philosophy. In this context, the good life is defined as ‘flourishing’, referring to a state in which individuals have the opportunity for success, are healthy, well-fed, have social connections, and feel comfortable expressing their rights and freedom.

Many philosophers have attempted to understand how to live ‘the good life’, particularly in relation to others, raising several questions about our obligations to others and the extent to which their rights must be respected or even prioritised over our own freedoms.

I believe that while individual freedom is central to the good life, it cannot be achieved without respecting the rights of others, as freedom must be mutually recognised to be meaningful; because alone, it becomes domination rather than true freedom.

Philosophers Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche explore this idea, both with unique and crucial ideas surrounding the major question. Nietzsche believes the creation of values is central to living the good life, with regard for others a hindrance to individual freedoms, while de Beauvoir believes we cannot be truly free unless we fulfil our obligation to help others recognise their own freedom, but both challenge the assumption that we must follow the set values of society.

Ultimately, a ‘good life’ requires a balance of Nietzsche’s emphasis on self-created values and de Beauvoir’s recognition of others’ freedom, as neither can exist meaningfully without the other.

Friedrich Nietzsche argues that living the good life requires not letting others’ rights obstruct you from fulfilling your desires and creating your own values. He believes we must each individually strive to have the strength to break free from the ‘herd’ of society and embrace our freedom and authenticity. However, where de Beauvoir says we then have an obligation to help others recognise their freedom, he would argue that it restricts us from achieving maximal freedom.

In society, when we abide by the communal values set for us, such as choosing not to voice a controversial opinion favouring politeness and conformity over honesty and self-expression, we are submitting ourselves to a ‘slave morality’, similar to de Beauvoir’s ‘serious man’. While this highlights the dangers of blind conformity, he ignores the importance of shared values and cooperation in social stability.

Nietzsche claims the concept of a good-versus-evil morality is simply a social construct created to scare the ‘herd’ into conformity because we fear creating chaos and potential suffering, arguing that equality will cause “this degeneration of man”, reducing humanity to “the perfect herd animals”.

Yet, suffering is an essential element for growth, and adherence to the restriction of universal rights limits suffering, ultimately preventing societal progress. Instead, Nietzsche encourages a ‘master morality’, an authentic leader who doesn’t let the rights of others prevent individual freedom and the creation of values.

He would go even one step further, saying universal rights do not exist; there are only the rights you create for yourself through having the strength to break away from the ‘herd’. However, this dismissal of universal rights removes moral limits on individual behaviour, justifying potential harm.

De Beauvoir’s ‘adventurer’ closely resembles Nietzsche’s perfect man; however, unlike de Beauvoir, Nietzsche does not view indifference to others as a flaw, but rather as a necessary condition for true freedom. He implies that the ‘free spirit’ ultimately benefits humanity, as they reject conformity and create values, challenging societal norms and driving progress, acting as a model of ‘the good life’ for others to aspire to.

Ultimately, while de Beauvoir promotes our obligation to help others achieve freedom, Nietzsche rejects this, arguing instead that it limits our opportunity to focus on our own freedom, which is vital for the good life.

Simone de Beauvoir agrees with Nietzsche that the good life depends on individual freedom, but she argues that living the good life requires recognising and respecting the rights of others, as an element of accessing that freedom.

She approaches her argument by claiming we grow up in a world of ready-made values, and it is through the crisis of adolescence and realisation there are no ready-mades that we gain the opportunity to recognise our freedom and accept our obligation of the creation of values.

While her characterisation of society into four categories of humans is useful for understanding her principles, it ignores the nuances of humanity; not everyone can fit into one of those four categories.

For de Beauvoir, the ‘truly free man’, meaning someone who is living the good life to its fullest extent, recognises their own freedom and has strength to create their own values, but also fulfils their obligation to help others achieve freedom, labelling it the ‘real requirements’ of a good life.

This is a compelling idea as she recognises the inherent social nature of humanity. She argues that we must help others achieve freedom because our freedom has meaning only when those around us can act and respond freely, and authentically, to our actions: “to will oneself free is also to will others free”.

For example, even if you discover you have the freedom to express and voice your opinion whenever, if others don’t recognise their freedom to authentically respond, your expression becomes one-sided, undermining and diminishing your own freedom.

This is due to the nature of the society we live in. If existentialism was solipsistic, then a focus on personal freedom and an indifference to politics would be sufficient, and de Beauvoir’s ‘adventurer’ would be the perfect human. However, given that our actions do affect others, we cannot ignore their inherent right to freedom as well.

I think de Beauvoir makes a crucial point about our existence in relation to others in a way many philosophers overlook. If we operated in a world where no one else had freedom, our freedom becomes domination, not authentic existence, which undermines the purpose of freedom itself and the very conditions that make freedom meaningful.

However, she seems to ignore the importance of conflict in societal growth, as well as the concept that true greatness comes from going beyond others, not just working with them, both points that Nietzsche focuses on.

Overall, de Beauvoir believes that only the freedom of others keeps ‘each one of us from hardening in the absurdity of facticity’, as our choices only matter when others are free enough to respond genuinely to them, highlighting why we must respect others’ rights, particularly their right to freedom, as our own authenticity depends on it.

By borrowing from both Nietzsche and de Beauvoir, we can perhaps develop a richer approach to the problem of rights. Nietzsche presents interesting points that make us reconsider why we should have to respect others beneath us and not prioritise our own freedom and happiness, but, given the inherent social nature of human existence, we must recognise others’ freedom as a necessary condition of our own.

If you were the last person on Earth, you would have no freedom and no rights because you would have no one to endorse, restrict, or respond at all to them, portraying de Beauvoir’s idea that our freedom is only meaningful when it is in relation to others, so others’ inability to respond freely to your actions takes away the meaning of your freedom.

This example highlights why de Beauvoir’s views are more logical to follow, presenting a key weakness in Nietzsche’s argument, as his beliefs still rely on the existence of others to lead, despite his claim that they should be disregarded.

However, de Beauvoir’s arguments are not entirely realistic either, as she believes we should prioritise our obligation to help others achieve freedom, yet this may suppress our opportunities to reach the most success in life on a personal level, restricting our freedom and undermining what de Beauvoir is ultimately promoting.

Both philosophers effectively explore the significance of respecting others’ rights in living a good life. While de Beauvoir presents an encouraging view about practising your own freedom through cooperative projects of freedom with others, it is Nietzsche who shows us that a strong and individualistic willingness to suffer is necessary to participate in these projects of elevation.

Nietzsche’s emphasis on individual freedom and the creation of values challenges societal conformity and highlights the importance of authenticity; however, his rejection of the significance of others’ rights overlooks the fundamentally communal nature of humanity.

Whereas de Beauvoir recognises that freedom is not experienced in isolation, but within a shared world where the ability to be truly free depends on the freedom of others. Although her expectation that individuals prioritise the freedom of others may at times limit personal success, her argument considers the interconnectedness of human life.

Therefore, to live the good life, it is necessary to respect the rights of others, as only then, through mutual recognition, can true freedom and flourishing be achieved.